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Abstract—Cyber data attacks are the worst-case interacting
bad data to power system state estimation and cannot be
detected by existing bad data detectors. In this paper, we for
the first time analyze the likelihood of cyber data attacks by
characterizing the actions of a malicious intruder. We propose
to use Markov decision process to model an intruder’s strategy,
where the objective is to maximize the cumulative reward across
time. Linear programming method is employed to find the
optimal attack policy from the intruder’s perspective. Numerical
experiments are conducted to study the intruder’s attack strategy
in test power systems.
Index Terms—cyber data attacks, Markov Decision Process,
state estimation, power systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
State estimation [1] solves for power system states from
obtained measurements. The correct estimation of systems
states is vital for the reliable operation of power systems. Since
bad data can result in significant errors in the outcome of state
estimation and potentially lead to catastrophic consequences,
the detection and identification of bad data has been exten-
sively studied [3], [6], [13], [14], [21] in state estimation.
The integration of cyber infrastructures in future smart grids
inevitably increases the possibility of cyber attacks. Cyber
data attacks, firstly studied in [12], means that a malicious
intruder with system configuration information simultaneously
manipulates multiple measurements and the injected errors
cannot be detected by any bad data detector.
State estimation in the presence of cyber data attacks has
attracted much research attention recently [2], [4], [9], [11],
[12], [16]–[18]. Some work focused on the identification of
a small number of key measurement units such that if those
units are protected from an intruder, the intruder cannot launch
a successful cyber data attack [2], [4], [8]. A few recent
work [11], [17], [19] considered the detection of cyber data
attacks in a power system with Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems or phasor measurement units
(PMUs) and various detection methods have been proposed.
What is missing in the literature of cyber data attacks is the
analysis of the frequency of data attacks in smart grids and
the likelihood of attacks at a given system state. This paper
takes the first step to analyze the likelihood of data attacks
from the intruder’s perspective. We consider a scenario that if
a cyber data attack is detected by the operator, the affected
measurement units will be protected for some time. Thus, the
intruder’s current action affects its future available actions.
To address such challenge in developing an attack strategy,
we propose to use Markov Decision Process (MDP) [15] to
model the intruder’s attack decision across time. The solution
to the resulting MDP is a mapping from system states to the
intruder’s actions (attack or not, which bus to attack and how
much error to inject). Numerical experiments are carried on
PJM 5-bus system to verify the proposed approach and study
the likelihood of cyber attacks in such systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We motivate
the problem and introduce cyber data attacks and MDP in
Section II. We formulate the intruder’s attack strategy as an
MDP and introduce its solution method in Section III. Section
IV records our numerical study on an example network. We
conclude the paper in Section V.
II. PROBLEM MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
We first introduce the definition and existing work on cyber
data attacks in Section II-A. We then motivate and introduce
the problem of likelihood analysis of cyber data attacks in
Section II-B. One main contribution of our paper is to model
this problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). MDPs are
introduced in Section II-C.
A. Cyber Data Attacks in Power Systems
In a power system, the state is usually represented by bus
voltage magnitudes V ∈ Rn and angles θ ∈ [−pi, pi]n, where
n is the number of buses. State estimation [1] solves for
system states from the obtained measurements. Under the AC
measurement model, the measurements z can be expressed as
a nonlinear function of state variables x = (V ,θ):
z = h(x) + ω, (1)
where ω represents the random measurement noise.
In the AC state estimation, the state variables are determined
from the weighted least square optimization problem:
xˆ = argmin(z − h(x))T ·R−1 · (z − h(x)), (2)
where R is the covariance matrix of measurement noise ω.
Malicious intruders can hack the measuring devices and
inject interacting errors to the measurements. If they have suf-
ficient system information and choose the errors ez satisfying
z + ez = h(x
′) + ω
= h(V + eV , θ + eθ) + ω,
(3)
where eV and eθ represent the resulting errors on state
variables V and θ respectively, the manipulated measurements
cannot be detected by existing bad data detectors. In this
case, instead of correctly estimating state variables (V , θ), the
operator would obtain a wrong estimate (V + eV , θ + eθ).
Since such cyber data attacks cannot be identified by bad
data detectors, many efforts have been devoted to identify and
protect a small number of key measurement units such that
an intruder cannot inject unobservable attacks without hacking
protected units [2], [4], [8]. A few recent work [11], [17], [19]
considered the detection of data attacks and various detection
methods have been proposed.
The potential financial risks of cyber data attacks are studied
in [20] and [7], where the congestion pattern is defined as the
set of congested lines. By injecting false data without being
detected, the intruders could change the congestion pattern and
thus change the locational marginal price (LMP). The intruders
can obtain financial reward from the resulting change in LMP.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to attacks that satisfy
(3) and result in a change of the system congestion pattern.
By launching a data attack, if a line’s real power is wrongly
estimated to exceed its capacity while it actually is not, or the
power is wrongly estimated to below its limit while the line is
actually congested, then the intruder can gain a reward from
the attack.
B. Likelihood of Cyber Data Attacks
One important question that has not been considered before
is the analysis of the likelihood of cyber data attacks at a given
operating state of power systems.
In this paper, we act as an intruder and aim to find the
optimal attack strategy from an intruder’s perspective. We
assume that an intruder can obtain a reward from a change
of the congestion pattern by injecting false data without
being detected. The intruder aims to maximize the cumulative
reward. If a cyber data attack, however, is detected by detection
methods such as [11], [17], [19], we assume the intruded
measuring devices will be protected for some time so that
an intruder cannot change the measurements of these devices
during the period. A detected attack, therefore, can limit the
intruder’s future actions and thus reduce the future reward.
Since the state of a power system changes across time, and
the future state is unknown to the intruder, it needs to decide
when and which buses to attack to maximize the total rewards
based on its current estimate. We employ Markov Chains [15]
to model the evolution of power system states and formulate
the intruder’s decision process as a Markov Decision Process
[15]. The solution of resulting MDP is a mapping from system
states to the intruder’s actions.
C. Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)
An MDP is a mathematical framework employed to model
the decision-making process in stochastic environments. In
this framework, the system is modeled via a series of states
S. Each state s ∈ S has an associated set of actions A(s).
In time step t, a decision is made based on the system’s
current state st ∈ S, and an action at ∈ A(st) is chosen to
conduct. The cost of taking action at at state st is G(st, at).
Then following the state transition probability distribution,
the system transits to a new state st+1 with a probability
of P (st+1|st, at). A reward R(st+1|st, at) is received from
the state transition. As the system evolves, a sequence of
rewards is obtained. The aim for decision-makers is to choose
sequential actions that yield maximal expected rewards over
the total decision-making horizon. The MDP problem can
be solved by numerous methods, like value iteration, policy
iteration and linear programming approaches discussed in [15].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
In Section III-A, the problem is formulated from the per-
spective of attackers and the strategy of cyber data attacks is
modeled as an infinite-horizon MDP. The solution method of
resulting MDP is discussed in Section III-B.
A. Problem Formulation
1) States and Time Steps: Here we employ bus voltage
magnitudes, angles and the states of measuring devices to-
gether as system states in an MDP. Because the measurements
contain noise and an intruder may have limited knowledge
of the states of a power system, we use discrete states to
model the intruder’s estimate of actual power system states.
For example, let Vi denote the voltage magnitude of bus i,
V maxi and V mini denote the upper bound and lower bound of
Vi respectively. ∆Vi = V maxi −V mini . nV denotes the number
of discrete states in the range. We define the state of the voltage
magnitude of bus i as
V¯i = q/(nV − 1), q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , nV − 1}, (4)
if Vi ∈
[
V mini + q ×
∆Vi
nV −1
, V mini + (q + 1)×
∆Vi
nV −1
)
. Sim-
ilarly, let θi denote the voltage angle of bus i, θmaxi and
θmini denote its upper bound and lower bound respectively,
nθ denote the number of discrete states. ∆θi = θmaxi − θmini .
We say the state of the voltage angle of bus i is
θ¯i = q/(nθ − 1), q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , nθ − 1}, (5)
if θi ∈
[
θmini + q ×
∆θi
nθ−1
, θmini + (q + 1)×
∆θi
nθ−1
)
. The state
of the jth measuring device is denoted by a variable U¯j :
U¯j =
{
1 jth device is open to attack,
0 jth device is protected from intrusion .
(6)
If a measuring device is protected, then an intruder cannot
change any measurements of that device. Otherwise, an in-
truder can change partial or all measurements of that device.
We consider a discrete-time system, and the time step is
set as the duration between two consecutive instants of state
estimation. The sampling rate of measuring devices can be
higher than the state estimation frequency, as shown in Fig. 1.
Attacks can happen during either device sampling or data
transmission to control center. We assume if intruders decide
to attack a device during step t, they need to change all
the measurements of that device in the time step. Otherwise,
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Fig. 1. Event sequence with cyber data attacks. An intruder changes the
observations of measuring devices to mislead the operator.
the attack can be easily detected by comparing consecutive
measurements. If a power system has M buses and N devices,
the state st at time step t is
st =
[
V¯ (t), θ¯(t), U¯(t)
]
=
[
V¯1(t), · · · , V¯M (t), θ¯1(t), · · · , θ¯M (t), U¯1(t), · · · , U¯N(t)
]
,
(7)
where V¯i(t), θ¯i(t) and U¯j(t) represent the states of voltage
magnitude and angle of bus i and the state of jth device at
time step t respectively.
2) Actions, Rewards and Costs: Since the reward results
from a change in the congestion pattern, in order to change the
line power, the intruder needs to inject errors to the estimate
of voltage phasors of incident buses. Let eVi and eθi denote
the injected errors to the voltage magnitude and angle of bus
i respectively. To make the problem tractable, we assume eVi
and eθi can only be multiples of ∆VinV −1 and
∆θi
nθ−1
respectively,
and the resulting estimates of system variables still lie in
individual allowable range. In this case, there are totally
nV × nθ available ways to inject errors to one bus voltage
phasor. Note that in order to pass the bad data detection, given
eV and eθ, an intruder needs to choose the injected errors ez
to measurements according to (3).
We call a set of buses and lines as target buses and
target lines respectively if the intruder attempts to change the
congestion pattern of these lines by injecting errors on the
target buses. Since an intruder may have limited resources to
launch attacks, we assume at each time step the intruder can
manipulate the states of at most d bus voltages. The intruder,
therefore, has at most
∑d
i=0
(
M
i
)
ways to select target buses.
The launched attacks can be detected by some recently
developed methods, as presented in section II-B. Here we use
pd(s, a) to denote the probability that an action a at state s is
detected by the network operator. We suppose it is a function
of injected errors on the bus voltage magnitudes and angles:
pd(s, a) = 1− exp
(
−C ×
M∑
i=1
(
|eVi |
∆Vi
+
|eθi |
∆θi
))
, (8)
where C is a positive constant. Intuitively, a larger C means
a higher probability with which the launched attack can be
detected.
Since the bus voltage magnitudes and angles are in dis-
cretized states, instead of computing the power flow of line ij
directly from one specific state (V¯ , θ¯), we can obtain the lower
and upper bound of its absolute value, denoted as Pminij (V¯ , θ¯)
and Pmaxij (V¯ , θ¯) respectively. Since the reward results from a
change in the congestion pattern, we define the reward as a
function proportional to the gap between the line’s flow limit
and the power bounds with injected errors:
Rij =


Kij ×
(
Pminij (V¯
′, θ¯′)− PMij
)
/PMij ,
if Pminij (V¯ ′, θ¯′) > PMij > Pmaxij (V¯ , θ¯);
Kij ×
(
PMij − P
max
ij (V¯
′, θ¯′)
)
/PMij ,
if Pminij (V¯ , θ¯) > PMij > Pmaxij (V¯ ′, θ¯′).
(9)
where Kij is the given reward weight of line ij, PMij is the
power flow limit of line ij, (V¯ ′, θ¯′) is the resulting estimate
of system states by injecting errors (eV , eθ) to (V¯ , θ¯).
The expected immediate reward from action a at state s is:
R(s, a) =
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a)×R(s′|s, a)
= (1 − pd(s, a))×
∑
ij∈Φ(s,a)
Rij .
(10)
where Φ(s, a) is the set of target lines.
We assume the cost to intrude an accessible measuring
device is fixed and known to an intruder, denoted by gu. Let
f(Φ(s, a)) denote the number of intruded measuring devices
in attack a, the attack cost at state s is:
G(s, a) = gu × f(Φ(s, a)). (11)
3) State Transition Probabilities: We assume all measuring
devices that are currently open to attack will stay open without
attack. An action a at state s is detected with probability
pd(s, a), and the intruded devices will be protected as a whole
in the next time step. Each protected device will change
to open in the next time step with a fixed probability pT .
Intuitively, a smaller pT indicates that once protected, a device
is more likely to stay inaccessible to intruders for a longer
period of time. When pT = 0, it means the protected devices
will no longer be accessible to intruders.
To model the dynamics of a power system, we assume
each load in the system evolves independently as a Markov
Chain [15] and the system state is determined from economic
dispatch. We assume each load has nL states and a load
can transit from state q1 to state q2 with a fixed and known
probability pq1,q2 . In practice, one can learn these transition
probabilities from historical data. In this case, in a power
network with M buses and N devices, if ML loads evolve as
Markov Chains, the total number of system state is nMLL ×2N .
B. MDP Solutions
A linear programming approach [5], [15] is applied to solve
MDP. A stationary policy pi for an MDP is a mapping pi : S 7→
A, where pi(s) is the action taken in state s. We define Wpi(s)
as the cumulative expected net reward by starting from state
s and following policy pi,
Wpi(s) = E
[
∞∑
t=0
γt (R(st, pi(st))−G(st, pi(st))|s0 = s)
]
,
(12)
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor for future reward. The
value of state s is the maximal cumulative reward,
W ∗(s) := max
pi∈Π
Wpi(s), (13)
where Π is the set of all available policies. The policy that
achieves the maximum in (13) is the optimal policy pi∗. It
is shown in [5] that W ∗(s) is the optimal solution to the
following optimization problem:
min
Q
∑
s∈S
Q(s)
s.t. Q(s) ≥ R(s, a)−G(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a)Q(s′)
∀a ∈ A(s), ∀s, s′ ∈ S.
(14)
Therefore, we can find W ∗(s) by solving (14) and compute
pi∗(s) defined as
argmax
a∈A(s)
(R(s, a)−G(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a)W ∗(s′)). (15)
The optimal attack strategy is a mapping between system state
s and the corresponding optimal action pi∗(s). An intruder can
solve the MDP to obtain the strategy offline and then inject
attacks accordingly in real-time operations.
IV. SIMULATION
We test our proposed method on the PJM 5-bus system. The
basic system configuration and the generation bids, generation
MW limits and MW loads are shown in Fig. 2. More details
can be found in [10].
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Fig. 2. The PJM 5-bus system
1) States of loads and transition probability. Each load is
assumed to have 2 states. The loads in Fig. 2 are the base
case loads. Another state for each load is half of its base case.
The transition probability from one state to another is 0.5.
2) Measuring device transition probability. pT is set 0.5. The
attack detection probability is calculated from (8).
3) Costs. The number of target buses at each time step is at
most one. The reward weight of each line is 1. The cost gu is
set as 0.05.
4) Discount factor. The discount factor γ = 0.95.
We solve the economic dispatch in MATPOWER toolbox in
MATLAB. The power flow limit of each line is set 300 MW.
We relax the constraint in economic dispatch from Pij ≤ PMij
to Pij ≤ 1.2PMij . We set V max = 1.1 p.u. (per unit), V min =
1.0 p.u., nV = 5; ∆θ = 5◦, nθ = 10, θmaxi and θmini are
determined from the actual values of bus i in eight load states.
For each discretized state, we calculate the lower and upper
bounds of each line power flow. One line can be an available
target line if the upper bound of its power flow is below the
power limit or the lower bound is over the limit.
We solve (14) and (15) to obtain the optimal actions for
23 × 23 = 64 states and compute the static distribution
probabilities of all states. The attack probability of one line
is computed as the sum of the distribution probabilities of
the states under which the optimal action is to change the
congestion pattern of that line. The intrusion probability of
one device is the sum of the distribution probabilities of the
states under which the optimal action requires manipulating
partial or all measurement of that device. The results of the
likelihood of data attacks are shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
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Generally, as C increases, the attack probability of each line
and each measuring device decreases. When C = 0, it means
the launched attack cannot be detected by network operators.
In this case, the intruders always choose the action that brings
about the maximal immediate net reward. When C ≥ 4, the net
expected reward for each action is negative, hence the optimal
action for all states is no attack.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
We for the first time analyze the likelihood of cyber data
attacks to power systems. We model an intruder’s attack
strategy as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). We compute
the optimal attack action at a given power system state from an
intruder’s perspective. We study the likelihood of cyber data
attacks on a small system through simulation. One ongoing
work is to apply the method to likelihood analysis of cyber
data attacks on larger power systems.
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